Murder of
Deputy Sheriff Charles Busby Smith On January 12,
1981, Charles Busby Smith is
buried in the Winona Gardens of Memory in Winona, Mississippi. Article 1
– Article 2 – Article 3 – Article 4 Waddell
Laney’s Request for Rehearing 421
So.2d 1216 Waddell
LANEY No.
53690. Supreme
Court of Oct.
13, 1982. John E. Shaw, Kosciusko, for appellant. Bill Allain, Atty. Gen. by Wayne Snuggs,
Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. En Banc. DAN M. LEE, Justice, for the Court: Waddell Laney, appellant, was indicted, tried and convicted for
the capital murder of Charles Busby Smith, deputy sheriff of Montgomery
County who was acting within his official capacity. At the conclusion of the
sentencing phase of Laney's trial, the jury sentenced him to death. Finding
error, we reverse and remand for a new trial. The facts of this case are not disputed. On January 12, 1981,
Sheriff Billy Costilow went to the residence of Waddell Laney to serve a
lunacy writ issued by a chancery court and deliver Laney to the Region Six
Mental Health Center in Greenwood. Sheriff Costilow was accompanied by Deputy
Sheriff Charles Busby Smith. Upon arrival, the officers knocked on Laney's
door. They also called out several times, but no one answered. Thinking
nobody was home, the officers walked off the porch and into the yard. Once they
were in the yard, Laney came from behind the house, carrying a .22-caliber
rifle in his left hand and a Kaiser blade in his right. Sheriff Costilow and
Laney walked toward each other. The [421
So.2d 1217] sheriff informed Laney of the writ and their purpose, which was
to take him to the doctor for some mental health treatment. Laney, replying
that there was nothing wrong with him, turned and walked toward his house. He
suddenly wheeled around and started shooting at the officers. Sheriff
Costilow was seriously injured; Deputy Smith was killed. Following the
shooting, Laney ran, dropping the Kaiser blade, but holding on to the gun. A
short time later, Laney was arrested by Jerry Butler, a Mississippi highway
patrolman. On March 31, 1981, Laney was indicted for capital murder in the
shooting death of Deputy Sheriff Smith. Laney invoked the insanity defense. The issue presented in this case is
whether Laney was afforded a fair trial in light of the fact that a juror,
Mrs. Ruth Brister, did not completely and fully
respond to questions asked during the voir dire
examination. During this examination, defense counsel asked the following
questions: "Is there anybody on the panel related by blood or marriage
to any present law enforcement person in Montgomery County, or anywhere
else?"; and, "Is there any other member related by blood or
marriage to any law enforcement officer or has any member ever been employed
by law enforcement, at any time in the past?" Two jurors answered affirmatively and were
excused. Mrs. Brister did not answer. During a hearing on the motion for a new trial, it was learned
that one of Mrs. Brister's brothers had been Deputy
Sheriff and Sheriff of Montgomery County approximately twenty years before
the trial, and also had been employed by the State Fire Marshal's office
until a short time before the trial; that another brother was, at the time of
trial, an investigator with the Mississippi Highway Patrol, and that her
nephew was currently serving as a Mississippi highway patrolman. Despite this,
the circuit court judge denied Laney's motion for a new trial. This was
error. Because of the nature of this case, we must first deal with
the standard of review to be employed. We recently stated in Irving
v. State, With this guidepost, we now turn to the question of whether
the court committed reversible error in failing to grant Laney a new trial
upon undisputed proof of juror Brister's law
enforcement kinships. In Odom v. State, [421 So.2d 1218] We also recognized in Odom that "it is readily
evident that no firm, unbending rule can be laid down that would control
every situation that might arise on the voir dire
of prospective jurors. Therefore, each case must be decided on an ad hoc
basis considering the facts then before the court." 355 So.2d at 1383.
In the instant case, the trial was held in the county in which Sheriff
Costilow and Deputy Smith served. Because this is a rural county in which
most of its residents were surely aware of the shooting of the sheriff and
the killing of his deputy, the air was no doubt charged with emotion.
Finally, the fact that Mrs. Brister was related to
three law enforcement officers would, under the circumstances, be a very
crucial issue. Defense counsel would certainly have exercised a challenge to
her service on the jury.1 It is clear that the three-pronged Odom test
was answered in the affirmative. As to the fourth, it is inescapable
that prejudice to Laney in selecting the jury reasonably could be inferred
from Mrs. Brister's failure to respond when
viewed in the light of the heightened review standard used in death penalty
cases, which leads us to hold that a new trial should be ordered. We deem it necessary, however, to discuss the insanity
defense, another issue presented in this case. This Court has for many years
adhered to the M'Naghten Rule as the test of
insanity. Our earliest cases dealing with insanity are Bovard v. State, 30 Miss. 600 (1856); and Cunningham v. State, 56 Miss. 269 (1879). This test is as
follows: In Hill v. State, substantial
capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. [421 So.2d 1219] In Edmond v. State, Finally, in Harvey v. State, In the instant case, we are not swayed to abandon the use of
the M'Naghten test of insanity, and
we hold that M'Naghten remains the
law in this state with regard to the insanity defense. Because we have concluded that the lower court committed
reversible error when it denied Laney a new trial, his conviction and
sentence must be reversed. We decline to address the remaining assignments of
error since Laney must be retried. Based on the foregoing, this cause is reversed and remanded
for a new trial. REVERSED AND
REMANDED. PATTERSON, C.J., SUGG and WALKER, P.JJ., and BROOM, BOY NOBLE
LEE, BOWLING and PRATHER, JJ., concur. HAWKINS, J., took no part. Laney
v. State 486 So. 2d 1242 (1986) Waddell LANEY v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 56116. Supreme Court of Mississippi. March 19, 1986. [486 So.2d 1243] John E. Shaw, Kosciusko, for appellant. Edwin Lloyd Pittman, Atty. Gen. by DeWitt Allred, Sp.
Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. Before WALKER, DAN M. LEE and ROBERTSON, JJ. WALKER, Presiding Justice, for the Court: This case is before us for the second time. Appellant's
conviction for capital murder and sentence of death was reversed and remanded
by this Court in Laney v. State, 421 So. 2d 1216 (Miss. 1982) for failure of
the lower court to grant a new trial upon discovery that one of the jurors
failed to respond to questions posed during voir dire.
Upon retrial Laney was again convicted of capital murder for the killing of
Deputy Sheriff Charles Smith and was sentenced to serve the remainder of his
natural life in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections.
Hence, this second appeal. FACTS On January 12, 1981 Sheriff Costilow and Deputy Sheriff
Smith of Montgomery County were called upon to serve a chancery court writ
upon Laney and transport him to the Region Six Mental Health Clinic in
Greenwood, Mississippi for an evaluation to determine whether or not he was
in need of mental treatment. The officers, who were in uniform, drove to
Laney's home located in the south east portion of Montgomery County. They
drove in a blue police car equipped with lights on top and stars on the side
of the door. Upon arriving the officers parked the car, got out and
walked onto the porch where they observed a padlock on the front door of
Laney's home. Thinking Laney was not home they walked away from the house.
Smith went to the north side of the house to look for Laney. As Costilow
stepped off the porch and turned he saw [486 So.2d 1244] Laney coming from behind the house with a kaiser (bush)
blade in his right hand and a .22 caliber rifle in his left hand. Costilow
approached Laney and informed him of the writ, which was in the police car,
and the purpose of their visit. Laney told the officers he was on his own
property and had not bothered anyone and the Lord had sent him out there to
preach and that was what he was going to do. He told the officers he was not
going to go with them. As Laney walked past Costilow, Costilow turned and
"he (Laney) wheeled around to his left real fast and started
shooting". Costilow said Laney "... got real upset; real mad."
Officer Costilow was wounded and Smith was fatally shot. Following the
shooting Laney ran off into the woods. Shortly thereafter he was arrested by
Officer Jerry Butler, a criminal investigator with the Highway Patrol. Laney
offered to, and indeed did, lead the arresting officers to the location of
the rifle used in the shooting. Following a hearing on Laney's competency to stand
trial and a finding that he was competent he was tried before a jury. That
jury, after reviewing all testimony and evidence offered at trial, found him
guilty of capital murder. A sentencing hearing was held and Laney was
sentenced to a term of life imprisonment in the custody of the Mississippi
Department of Corrections. Aggrieved with the holding of the lower court he
has perfected his appeal to this Court assigning as error in the court below: I. THE FINDING THAT HE WAS COMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL;
II. THE FINDING, BASED ON THE EVIDENCE, THAT HE WAS NOT M'NAGHTEN INSANE AT
THE TIME THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED; AND III. THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO GRANT SIX
OF THE INSTRUCTIONS OFFERED BY HIS COUNSEL AND THE GRANTING OF STATE'S
INSTRUCTION S-4 HAVING TO DO WITH THE FORM OF THE VERDICT. COMPETENCY Prior to the competency hearing Laney had been under
the care of Dr. Helen Robertson, a psychologist, and Dr. Margie Lancaster, a
medical doctor with a specialty in neurology, at the State Mental Hospital at
Whitfield. Both doctors were of the opinion that Laney was competent to stand
trial and offered detailed testimony in support of their opinions. Dr. Charlton Stanley, a forensic psychologist and Dr.
Donald Guild, a psychiatrist, were also called to testify. Both doctors had
formerly been associated with Whitfield and testified at Laney's first trial.
These doctors were called upon by the court to re-evaluate Laney prior to his
second trial. Based on their brief re-evaluation examination in September of
1983 Dr. Stanley was of the opinion that Laney was not competent to stand
trial. In September Dr. Guild, by letter, informed the court that Laney was
competent to stand trial. At this hearing, however, Dr. Guild explained that
his opinion rendered in September was based upon an examination conducted in
a non-stressful atmosphere. He was concerned as to whether or not Laney was
capable of maintaining that competency under the stress of a trial. Neither
Dr. Stanley or Guild had treated Laney since 1981 and Guild did testify that
those doctors who were treating Laney on a regular basis were far better able
to evaluate his ability to testify and communicate with counsel at trial than
he. These were the people who had most recently observed him in staffing
sessions at the State Hospital. He explained that in a staffing session a
stressful situation is created much like a courtroom atmosphere. Based on the above testimony the court determined that
Laney was competent to stand trial. When the trial court has made a finding
that the evidence does not show a probability that the defendant is incapable
of making a rational defense, this Court will not overturn that finding
unless we can say, from the evidence, that the finding was manifestly against
the overwhelming [486 So.2d 1245] weight of the evidence. Emanuel v. State, 412 So. 2d
1187 (Miss. 1982). Reviewing the testimony we find no error in the court's
decision regarding Laney's competency to stand trial. GUILTY VERSUS GUILT BY REASON OF INSANITY In our opinion in Laney we said that the M'Naghten test of insanity remains the law in this State
with regard to the insanity defense. We reiterate that test as follows: To establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it
must be clearly proved that at the time of committing of the act the accused
was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind as (1)
not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or (2) if he did
know it that he did not know that he was doing what was wrong. 421 So.2d at
1218. Also see Merrill v. State, 482 So. 2d 1147 (Miss.
1986); Frost v. State, 453 So. 2d 695 (Miss. 1984); Billiot
v. State, 454 So. 2d 445 (Miss. 1984), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 1232, 84 L.Ed.2d 369 (1985); Edwards v. State, 441
So. 2d 84 (Miss. 1983); Groseclose v. State, 440 So. 2d 297 (Miss. 1983). Although the expert witnesses expressed their views
that Laney was M'Naghten insane at the time he
committed the crime, their testimony before the jury did not bear that out.
The jury, upon hearing the expert's testimony and upon being properly
instructed as to M'Naghten had ample evidence upon
which to determine that Laney was not M'Naghten
insane when he shot Deputy Smith. Furthermore, expert opinions of
psychiatrists are not conclusive upon the issue of insanity but rather
insanity is a question to be resolved by the jury. Lias
v. State, 362 So. 2d 198 (Miss. 1978). Also see Billiot
v. State, 454 So. 2d 445 (Miss. 1984). It is uncontradicted in the record that Laney suffers
from the mental disorder, schizophrenia, paranoia type. However, this does
not in itself make him M'Naghten insane. At the first trial Dr. Guild was of the opinion that
Laney was competent to stand trial as well as being responsible for his
actions in accordance with objective criterion. Guild believed that Laney was
sane at that time in the sense that Laney might have thought others would
perceive his actions as illegal. In other words, according to Guild, he might
have known or he would have known that others would think that the killing
was unlawful, but that he thought it was right. After spending approximately
one and one-half hours with Laney since the first trial Dr. Guild explained
his initial impression was wrong and was now of the opinion that Laney was so
disorganized and delusional at the time that he did not comprehend right from
wrong. Guild said "... I don't think that you can morally hold Waddell
Laney responsible for the death of the deputy. I just cannot do that."
Guild said ". . my opinion is still that he knew the nature and quality of
his acts." That is, Laney was aware that he had a .22 rifle which could
kill or severely injure. However, Guild did not believe Laney knew that his
actions were wrong because of his mental illness. With regard to Laney, Guild
said, "I certainly believe that if you feel that God has commanded you
to do something, you would have to have the ultimate right on your
side." Dr. Lancaster was asked to explain why she felt Laney
was not responsible for his actions. She said "He felt that he was
acting on direct orders from God. He knew that killing a man was wrong
legally, but he felt if God commanded him to do this, that it was
right." When asked "Did the Defendant know the nature and quality
of his act on January 12, 1981?" She responded "He knew that killing
a person was wrong in the eyes of the law, or the state's law." Again on
cross-examination she said "He knew he was shooting the sheriff and the
deputy and he was to kill them, yes". She acknowledged that he knew
killing a law enforcement officer was against the law of the State of
Mississippi and that society did not approve of killing. [486 So.2d 1246] Dr. Robertson was of the opinion that Laney knew the
nature and quality of his act on January 12, 1981. She testified "... I
think also he knew at the time of the shooting it was wrong to kill a
person". When asked if Laney knew it was against the laws of the State
of Mississippi to kill a human being she said, "Yes, I think he
did". According to Dr. Stanley, Laney was M'Naghten
insane at the time the crime was committed, although in 1981 his opinion was
that Laney was sane at the time he committed the crime. Stanley was asked
whether or not Laney knew the nature and quality of his act. He said
"Yes, at the time of the shooting of the sheriff and the deputy, he did
know the nature and quality. He knew he was shooting the uniformed officers.
He knew that shooting at a man would make him very, very dead." Although
Stanley testified Laney could not appreciate the wrongfulness of his act,
when asked "So, then, he did know that he was violating the laws of the
state of Mississippi.", he responded "Yeah, I think that he knew
that the law would take a dim view if you'd asked him, that the law would
take a dim view of him shooting a law enforcement officer." Various relatives of Laney and community members
testified with regard to his sanity. The general opinion was that Laney had
never been normal, had always been different. It was based upon the above testimony that the jury
found Laney guilty of capital murder. The evidence is uncontradicted that
Laney knew the quality and nature of his acts. The testimony was also
abundantly clear that Laney knew what he was doing was considered wrong by
society and was wrong according to the laws of this State. The question
concerning Laney's insanity was a question for the jury's resolution. From
what they heard and observed at trial they determined that Laney knew the
nature and quality of the act of shooting Deputy Smith and was cognizant of
the fact that this act was wrong. We have carefully scrutinized this record and cannot
state that the jury's determination in this case was unsupported by the
evidence. INSTRUCTIONS The appellant argues that it was error to grant State
Instruction 4 as to the form of the verdict in that the first options available
to the jury relate to a finding of guilty of capital murder. We have examined
Instruction S-4 and are of the opinion that appellant's contention is without
merit. We have also carefully reviewed the instructions
requested by appellant and refused by the court and find them to be somewhat
confusing as well as repetitious of other instructions offered to the jury. A
trial court is not required to instruct a jury over and over on a principal
of law even though some variations are used in different instructions.
Groseclose v. State, 440 So. 2d 297 (Miss. 1983). Furthermore, all
instructions are to be read together and if the jury is fully and fairly
instructed by other instructions the refusal of any similar instruction does
not constitute reversal error. Groseclose, supra; Barr v. State, 359 So. 2d
334 (Miss. 1978). Having reviewed the instructions of the court to the jury,
we find that they accurately and sufficiently guided the jury in their
deliberations. Due to the nature of this case we have prudently
reviewed the holdings of the court below and find no error. After close
re-examination of the evidence offered at trial we find it was sufficient to
support the verdict of the jury. The conviction and sentence of appellant is
hereby affirmed. Should Laney's mental condition deteriorate to the
point that it is detrimental to his mental as well as physical health to
remain at the State facility at Parchman the
Commissioner has the authority to transfer him for observation, diagnosis and
treatment pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated § 47-5-120 (re-enacted 1984)
to a facility of the Department of Mental Health for his [486 So.2d 1247] safety as well as the safety of those around him. AFFIRMED. PATTERSON, C.J., ROY NOBLE LEE, P.J., and HAWKINS, DAN
M. LEE, PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN and ANDERSON, JJ., concur. ROBERTSON and DAN M. LEE, JJ., specially concur. ROBERTSON, Justice, concurring: This is another of those cases wherein the evidence is
overwhelming that the Defendant was at the time of his crime M'Naghten insane. Yet, as seems to happen invariably, the
jury rejected the insanity defense and returned a verdict of guilty. Compare
Edwards v. State, 441 So. 2d 84 (Miss. 1983); Groseclose v. State, 440 So. 2d
297 (Miss. 1983); and Lias v. State, 362 So. 2d 198
(Miss. 1978). Here we have been seriously urged that Laney is not
guilty because in his perception he was commanded by God to kill. We are told
that this rendered Laney legally incapable of committing murder. That guilt
or innocence should turn on such a matter seems absurd be the command from
God or the devil, if for no other reason that all too many of us all too
often mistake the voice of one for that of the other. In Groseclose I filed a separate opinion urging that we
consider modification of or outright abolition of the insanity defense.
Groseclose v. State, 440 So.2d at 302-06. The core of my view stated there is that consideration of any mental illness from which the
defendant may have been suffering at the time of his actions [should] be
postponed until sentencing. A criminal trial ought be
held for the purpose of determining whether the defendant committed the act
with which he had been charged [and whether that act was volitional as
distinguished from accidental]. Whether he was insane seems more relevant to
sentence or disposition. 440 So.2d at 305. In the two and a half years that have elapsed since
Groseclose I have reflected upon the matter and those reflections further
convince me of the "bankruptcy" of the insanity defense. It is
jury-nullified in the overwhelming majority of the cases in which its
elements are proved the case of Waddell Laney being only the latest. Because
insanity is a matter to my mind far more rationally related to sentence or
disposition than to guilt, and for the reasons I have set forth in much
greater detail in Groseclose, I would concur in today's judgment and urge
that at the earliest opportunity we abolish the insanity defense in this
state. DAN M. LEE, J., joins
in this opinion. Montgomery County Mississippi Sheriff
Billy Costilow (left) and Deputy Charles Busby Smith Waddell
Mercer Laney died in prison on January 29, 2006. |